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Abstract—In this letter, we model a cognitive radio network
as an interference market where each primary user (PU) and
secondary user (SU) are price–taking interference offerers and
purchasers, respectively. We consider stochastic interference
demands of SUs and the existence of random disturbances in
PUs’ interference observations. Exploiting the fact that the dB
value of the uplink inter–cell interference in CDMA networks is
modeled as a Gaussian normal distribution, the price–demand
decision process in each PU is given by a pair of stochastic
differential equations. Then, we investigate an equilibrium of
the interference market and its convergence in the context of
asymptotic stability in the mean. Numerical results illustrate
the convergence of the price–demand decision process to the
equilibrium.
Index Terms—Cognitive radio, spectrum market, stochastic
market equilibrium, stochastic differential equation, taˆtonnement
process.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN cognitive radio networks, spectra or interference are of-ten regarded as marketable products. That is, every primary
user (PU) offers its resources (i.e., spectra or interference) to
secondary users (SUs) with a certain price (per spectrum or per
interference); each SU purchases the offered resources with
determining the purchasing amount according to the price. As
a result, this market–based approach enables PUs to control
SUs’ resource usage by adjusting the price.
In general market, when demand and supply depend upon
current prices only, there exists an equilibrium price vector
under certain condition, called market equilibrium where the
total demand for each good is equal to the corresponding total
supply of that good; this market equilibrium can be expressed
as a stable solution of price and demand decision processes,
i.e., taˆtonnement process [1]. In this letter, we consider the
taˆtonnement process between PUs and SUs in CDMA systems:
(i) each PU sets the limit of interference inflicted by SUs (i.e.,
tolerable interference), and sets and announces the price per
interference to SUs; (ii) SUs decides collaboratively how much
of interference they would like to purchase for the announced
price from each PU; (iii) each PU increases the price if
it suffers higher interference than its tolerable interference,
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and decreases otherwise; (iv) SUs adjusts the amount of
interference to each PU in inverse proportion to the price;
(v) on every PU, if the total interference demand equates to
its interference limit with a positive price, the taˆtonnement
process terminates in equilibrium, i.e., market equilibrium,
and the price becomes an equilibrium price. Furthermore,
we consider the situation where PUs have no deterministic
information such as the number of transmitting SUs, their
transmitting power and locations, and channel states. Besides,
we assume the existence of an additive random disturbance
– representing the thermal noise and given as Gaussian white
noise – in the interference observation. Considering the pricing
for the uplink interference only1, we can utilize the random
interference model for CDMA networks developed in [2], and
whose main features are: (i) if the interference is expressed
in a dB value, then the random variable of the uplink inter–
cell interference follows normal Gaussian distribution, and its
dB mean and dB variance can be obtained by solving the
two nonlinear equations consisting of the moment generating
functions; (ii) the random interference is dependent on the
density of the wireless terminals, the target SNR (signal–to–
noise ratio) of SUs, the cell radius, and the distance between
secondary base stations (SBSs) and PUs. Then the taˆtonnement
process is given by a pair of stochastic differential equations
(SDEs), and we determine the market equilibrium in the
context of the stochastic stability.
Recently, a few notable market–based approaches have been
made with considering stochastic demand of spectrum or in-
terference [3], [4]. However, they have neither investigated the
stability of the price–demand decision process nor considered
the existence of random disturbances in PUs’ interference–
observations.
II. INTERFERENCE MARKET MODEL
Let ℒ be the set of all PUs, and let ∣ℒ∣ = 𝐿. We denote
the price per interference (in dB) decided by PU 𝑙 ∈ ℒ as
𝜋𝑙 (⋅), and the interference (in dB) PU 𝑙 suffers from as 𝑌𝑙 (⋅).
Then the taˆtonnement process for each 𝑙 ∈ ℒ is given by the
following ordinary differential equations (ODEs):
?˙?𝑙 (𝑡) = 𝛼
(
𝑌𝑙 (𝑡) + 𝜉𝑙 (𝑡)− 𝐽 𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑙
)
; (1)
?˙?𝑙 (𝑡) = −𝛽?˙?𝑙 (𝑡) (2)
where 𝛼 > 0 and 𝛽 > 0 are the speeds of adjustment for the
interference price and the interference demand, respectively,
𝐽 𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑙 is the interference limit tolerable by PU 𝑙, and 𝜉𝑙 (⋅) is
the Gaussian white noise indicating the random perturbation
1This work however can be extended to the downlink case if we have an
appropriate random interference model for downlink.
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in PU 𝑙’s interference-observation2. On every time 𝑡, each PU
𝑙 decides its price per interference according to the current
amount of interference from which it suffers, and the SUs
collaboratively update the amount of interference that will be
imposed on each PU 𝑙 according to the amount of change in
the current price decided by PU 𝑙.
As shown in (2), it is assumed that the SUs can control
the random interference imposed on each PU collaboratively.
More strictly, by exploiting the result that 𝑌𝑙 is given as a
Gaussian random variable [2], we assume that its statistical
parameters, i.e., mean and variance, can be controlled by
SUs collaboratively. Actually, it is possible to control the
statistical parameters as given by 𝑌𝑙 by controlling the target
SNR between SUs and SBS, and which however requires
further investigations and is remained as one of our future
works. Furthermore, for the simplicity, we assume that there
is a separate mechanism of transmission power control among
PUs, that is, we don’t consider the interference due to other
PUs’ transmission.
Since the Gaussian white noise is the time derivative of
the Wiener process denoted 𝑊 (⋅), the ODEs (1) and (2) are
properly interpreted into SDEs provided by
𝑑𝜋𝑙 (𝑡) = 𝛼
(
𝑌𝑙 (𝑡)− 𝐽 𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑙
)
𝑑𝑡+ 𝛼𝑊𝑙 (𝑡) ; (3)
𝑑𝑌𝑙 (𝑡) = −𝛽𝑑𝜋𝑙 (𝑡) . (4)
Then the equilibrium solution of the taˆtonnement process
is given by a pair
(
𝜋, Y¯
)
, where 𝜋 = (?¯?1, . . . , ?¯?𝐿) and
Y¯ =
(
𝑌1, . . . , 𝑌𝐿
)
, and is defined in pursuit of the context
of asymptotic stability in the mean [1] as follows:
Definition 1: If
(
𝜋, Y¯
)
is a stable solution for the
taˆtonnement process (3) and (4), then
(
𝜋, Y¯
)
is asymp-
totically stable in the mean (relative to the region 𝐻0)
if lim
𝑡→∞𝐸 [∣𝜋 (𝑡)− 𝜋∣] = 0 for ∣𝜋 (0)− 𝜋∣ < 𝐻0, and
lim
𝑡→∞𝐸
[∣∣Y (𝑡)− Y¯∣∣] = 0 for ∣∣Y (0)− Y¯∣∣ < 𝐻0.
Therefore, if Y¯ = J𝑡𝑜𝑙 where J𝑡𝑜𝑙 =
(
𝐽 𝑡𝑜𝑙1 , . . . , 𝐽
𝑡𝑜𝑙
𝐿
)
,
the equilibrium of the interference market is yielded with
the equilibrium price 𝜋. In the next section, we give the
formal proof that the taˆtonnement process converges to the
equilibrium.
III. PROOF OF THE CONVERGENCE TO THE MARKET
EQUILIBRIUM
Prior to describing the proof, we introduce some important
properties in stochastic calculus [5]:
Lemma 2: For all real–valued stochastic process 𝐺, we
have
𝐸
(∫ 𝑇
0
𝐺𝑑𝑊
)
= 0; (5)
𝐸
⎛
⎝(∫ 𝑇
0
𝐺𝑑𝑊
)2⎞⎠ = 𝐸
(∫ 𝑇
0
𝐺2𝑑𝑡
)
(6)
where 𝑊 is a Wiener process.
2This Gaussian white noise indicates simply an additive perturbation due to
the system loss factor not related to propagation, and is distinguished from the
thermal noise in wireless channels. The thermal noise is already considered
in 𝑌𝑙 (⋅).
A. Asymptotic Stability in the Mean of 𝑌
By showing lim
𝑡→∞𝐸
[∣∣Y (𝑡)− J𝑡𝑜𝑙∣∣] = 0, we can verify the
asymptotic stability in the mean of 𝑌 . To this end, we first
substitute (3) for 𝑑𝜋𝑙 (𝑡) in (4):
𝑑𝑌𝑙 (𝑡) = 𝛼𝛽
(
𝐽 𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑙 − 𝑌𝑙 (𝑡)
)
𝑑𝑡− 𝛼𝛽𝑊𝑙 (𝑡) . (7)
which is a linear SDE in narrow sense [5] whose solution is
given by3
𝑌 (𝑡) = 𝑒−𝛼𝛽𝑡𝑌 (0) +
∫ 𝑡
0
𝛼𝛽𝐽𝑒−𝛼𝛽(𝑡−𝑠)𝑑𝑠
+
∫ 𝑡
0
−𝛼𝛽𝑒−𝛼𝛽(𝑡−𝑠)𝑑𝑊
= 𝑒−𝛼𝛽𝑡𝑌 (0) + 𝐽
(
1− 𝑒−𝛼𝛽𝑡)
+
∫ 𝑡
0
−𝛼𝛽𝑒−𝛼𝛽(𝑡−𝑠)𝑑𝑊 . (8)
Then, the mean and variance are, respectively,
𝐸 [𝑌 (𝑡)] = 𝑒−𝛼𝛽𝑡𝐸 [𝑌 (0)] + 𝐽
(
1− 𝑒−𝛼𝛽𝑡)
+ 𝐸
[∫ 𝑡
0
−𝛼𝛽𝑒−𝛼𝛽(𝑡−𝑠)𝑑𝑊
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0by (5)
= 𝑒−𝛼𝛽𝑡𝐸 [𝑌 (0)] + 𝐽
(
1− 𝑒−𝛼𝛽𝑡) , (9)
and
𝑉 [𝑌 (𝑡)] = 𝐸
[
𝑌 2 (𝑡)
] − 𝐸 [𝑌 (𝑡)]2
= 𝑒−2𝛼𝛽𝑡𝐸
[
𝑌 2 (0)
]− 𝑒−2𝛼𝛽𝑡𝐸 [𝑌 (0)]2
+ 𝐸
[(∫ 𝑡
0
−𝛼𝛽𝑒−𝛼𝛽(𝑡−𝑠)𝑑𝑊
)2]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=𝐸[
∫ 𝑡
0
(𝛼𝛽)2𝑒−2𝛼𝛽(𝑡−𝑠)𝑑𝑠] by (6)
= 𝑒−2𝛼𝛽𝑡𝑉 [𝑌 (0)] +
𝛼𝛽
2
(
1− 𝑒−2𝛼𝛽𝑡) . (10)
If 𝑌 (0) ∼ 𝒩 (𝜇 (0) , 𝜎2 (0)), the above SDE is turned out
to be the Langevine equation that is the one of the models of
the motion of a Brownian particle, and it is shown that the
distribution of 𝑌 (𝑡) is yielded for 𝑡 ≥ 0 [5]
𝒩 (𝐸 [𝑌 (𝑡)] , 𝑉 [𝑌 (𝑡)]) . (11)
Therefore, we see that the taˆtonnement process is asymp-
totically stable in the mean of 𝑌 (relative to the region 𝐻0)
since lim
𝑡→∞𝐸 [∣𝑌 (𝑡)− 𝐽 ∣] = 0 for ∣𝑌 (0)− 𝐽 ∣ < 𝐻0.
B. Asymptotic Stability in the Mean of 𝜋
In order to examine the stability of 𝜋, substituting (8) for
𝑌 (𝑡) in (3), we have
𝑑𝜋 (𝑡) = 𝛼(𝑒−𝛼𝛽𝑡𝑌 (0)− 𝐽𝑒−𝛼𝛽𝑡
+
∫ 𝑡
0
−𝛼𝛽𝑒−𝛼𝛽(𝑡−𝑠)𝑑𝑊 )𝑑𝑡+ 𝛼𝑑𝑊, (12)
3Henceforth, we omit the index 𝑙, and let 𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑙 ≡ 𝐽 for simpler notations
in the equations
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Fig. 1. The transition of the random interference and the price in two
sampled PUs: ‘Y(t)’, ‘Ran Y(t)’, and ‘J tol’ are correspondent to left Y–axis,
and ‘price(t)’ and ‘E[price(t)]’ are correspondent to right Y–axis.
and, assuming 𝜋 (0) is a constant, its solution is given by
𝜋 (𝑡) = 𝜋 (0) +
1
𝛽
(
1− 𝑒−𝛼𝛽𝑡) (𝑌 (0)− 𝐽)
+
∫ 𝑡
0
∫ 𝜏
0
−𝛼2𝛽𝑒−𝛼𝛽(𝑡−𝑠)𝑑𝑊𝑑𝜏
+
∫ 𝑡
0
𝛼𝑑𝑊 (13)
Then the mean value of 𝜋 (𝑡) is
𝐸 [𝜋 (𝑡)] = 𝜋 (0) +
1
𝛽
(
1− 𝑒−𝛼𝛽𝑡) (𝑌 (0)− 𝐽)
+ 𝐸
[∫ 𝑡
0
∫ 𝜏
0
−𝛼2𝛽𝑒−𝛼𝛽(𝑡−𝑠)𝑑𝑊𝑑𝜏
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0by (5) and (6)
+ 𝐸
[∫ 𝑡
0
𝛼𝑑𝑊
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0by (5)
= 𝜋 (0) +
1
𝛽
(
1− 𝑒−𝛼𝛽𝑡) (𝑌 (0)− 𝐽) , (14)
and clearly,
𝐸 [𝜋 (∞)] = 𝜋 (0) + 1
𝛽
(𝑌 (0)− 𝐽) . (15)
As done in the case of 𝑌 , it is observed that the taˆtonnement
process is asymptotically stable in the mean of 𝜋 (rela-
tive to the region 𝐻𝑜) since lim
𝑡→∞𝐸 [∣𝜋 (𝑡)− 𝐽 ∣] = 0 for∣𝜋 (0)− 𝐽 ∣ < 𝐻0.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We perform a numerical experiment in order to verify
the stability of the taˆtonnement process (1) and (2), and
illustrate that the random interference generated by (11) and
the expected price given by (14), are asymptotically close to
the stable solutions of the taˆtonnement process on every time
𝑡. First, we generate a cognitive network of 10 PUs and 10
SBSs within a 2000m×2000m square. Then we generate the
initial statistical parameters of 𝑌𝑙 (0) for each 𝑙 ∈ ℒ, that
is, 𝐸 [𝑌𝑙 (0)] and 𝑉 [𝑌𝑙 (0)] utilizing the random interference
model developed in [2], and generate 𝑌𝑙 (0) following 𝑌𝑙 (0) ∼
𝒩 (𝐸 [𝑌𝑙 (0)] , 𝑉 [𝑌𝑙 (0)]). We let each 𝑙 have random 𝐽 𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑙
generated uniformly between -40dB and -20dB. In addition,
we assume that there is no change in the average number of
transmitting SUs during the taˆtonnement process. We initialize
𝜋𝑙 (0) to 200, and set the average number of transmitting SUs
in each SBS as 20. Then, we perform the taˆtonnement process
105 times, and each taˆtonnement is proceeded from 𝑡 = 0
until 𝑡 = 1500 with 𝛼 = 𝛽 = 0.1. On each 𝑡, we measure
the transition of the average solutions of the taˆtonnement
process (plotted with ‘Y(t)’ and ‘price(t)’ on the graph in
Fig.1) and the transition of the average interference and the
expected price (plotted with ‘Ran Y(t)’ and ‘E[price(t)]’ on
the graph, respectively) in two sampled PUs. As shown in
the graph, it is observed that the solutions of the taˆtonnement
process are quite close to the random interference and the
expected price in most of the time instances. Moreover, both
the random interference and the interference solution of the
taˆtonnement process, that is, ‘Y(t)’ and ‘Ran Y(t)’, approach
to the interference limit ‘J tol’ quite closely after around
𝑡 = 400.
As a result, we conclude that the taˆtonnement process is
easily expected to be asymptotically stable in the mean, and
the random interference process and the expected price model
given by (11) and (14), respectively, behave approximately
well toward the taˆtonnement process.
V. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we model a cognitive radio network as an
interference market, and investigate the market equilibrium
asymptotically stable in the mean. To this end, we express the
taˆtonnement process as a pair of SDE, and prove the stability
using some properties of stochastic calculus. The numerical
results illustrate the stability of the taˆtonnement process and
show that the stable solutions (i.e., price and interference) are
quite close to the market equilibrium.
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